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A model is developed where firms in a financial system have to settle their debts to each other by using
a liquid asset. The question that is studied is how many firms must obtain how much of this asset from
outside the financial system to make sure that all debts within the system are settled. The main result
is that these liquidity needs are larger when these firms are more interconnected through their debts,
i.e. when they borrow from and lend to more firms. Two pecuniary externalities are discussed. One
involves the choice of paying one creditor first rather than another.  The second involves the extent
to which firms borrow and acquire claims on other firms with the proceeds. When a group of firms
raises their involvement in this activity, firms outside the group may face more difficulties in settling
their debts.
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jrotemberg@hbs.eduThe last few years have seen an explosion of two types of ¯nancial transactions. First, the
volume of derivative instruments that are purchased and sold has ballooned. To give just one
example, the face value of \credit derivative swaps" may have reached $60 trillion by May
2008.1 Second, a vast number of intermediaries that call themselves hedge funds have been
created. While hedge funds vary a great deal in the transactions they pursue, many are quite
active in derivative markets. These hedge funds borrow from a set of ¯nancial intermediaries
while simultaneously acquiring claims on other intermediaries. Because many hedge funds
transact with a multitude of parties, the ¯nancial system has become quite interconnected.
This raises the obvious question of whether this interconnectedness strengthens or weakens
the ¯nancial system as a whole. Within this broad question, the current paper focuses on a
narrower one, namely whether this interconnectedness exacerbates the di±culties that ¯rms
have in meeting their obligations in periods where the volume of assets that is acceptable
for this purpose is reduced.
The ¯nancial obligations that ¯rms have vis-a-vis one another require these ¯rms to make
payments. To focus on the problems caused by insu±cient liquidity, I abstract from solvency
issues and consider ¯rms whose required payments are no larger than the amount that each
¯rm expects to receive from its debtors. These payments should thus present no problem
if ¯rms can borrow freely: any borrowing that a ¯rm makes to settle its obligations is then
extinguished as soon as its debtors pay their own obligations.
This situation can usefully be contrasted with one where loans for the purpose of settling
pre-existing obligations are di±cult or impossible to obtain. To honor their required pay-
ments on their obligations ¯rms must obtain acceptable (or \liquid") assets in some other
manner. The payments that ¯rms receive from their debtors are an obvious source of funds
for this purpose. Indeed, the ability of ¯rms to use funds they receive from their debtors to
pay o® their creditors implies that a dollar of acceptable liquid assets in the ¯nancial system
can be used to settle more than a single one dollar obligation. Nonetheless, I show that the
interconnectedness of the ¯nancial system impairs the system's capacity to use liquid assets
1See Reguly (2008) who also discusses the relationship of this volume to hedge funds.
1multiple times. As a result, more interconnected ¯nancial systems require more liquidity
(from sources outside the ¯nancial system) to settle a given volume of debt.
To gain intuition for this result, it is useful to start by noticing that the partial payments
of debts generate a pecuniary externality when ¯rms have multiple creditors. A ¯rm whose
liquid assets are currently smaller than its outstanding obligations may have to choose the
subset of its creditors to whom it will make payments. Some ¯rms care about this choice
even though their in°uence on this choice is likely to be negligible. This is true, in particular,
of the ¯rms that have claims on the original ¯rm's creditors. If ¯rm i has claims on ¯rm j, it
cares a great deal whether ¯rm k uses its limited liquidity to pay o® j or whether it chooses
to pay o® a fourth ¯rm ` instead.
From the point of view of the ¯nancial system as a whole, this choice may not be im-
material either. Imagine, in particular, that ¯rm ` has no further outstanding obligations
perhaps because it started out with su±cient liquid assets to pay o® all its creditors. Then,
¯rm k's decision concerning whether it should pay o® ¯rm ` or ¯rm j (which then pays k)
also a®ects the total volume of debts that is extinguished with the given supply of liquidity.
As the ¯nancial system becomes more interconnected, debtors with limited funds face
a larger array of potential recipients for these funds. It then becomes easier to envisage
situations where these funds go to ¯rms that either have no further obligations themselves,
or that have creditors with no further obligations. There thus exist \worst case scenarios"
where the existing liquidity settles many fewer obligations than is theoretically possible. By
way of contrast, this problem does not arise when each ¯rm has only one creditor. Firms
then have no choice regarding whom they pay and this reduces the scope for \wasting"
payments on ¯rms that have no further obligations left. This lends credence to the idea
that the di±culties caused by periods of scarce liquidity are exacerbated when there exists
a larger set of debt connections among ¯rms.
Because I am concerned with the capacity of solvent ¯rms to settle their obligations in
situations where interconnectedness di®ers, the paper focuses on a system where all ¯rms
have current claims that equal or exceed their current obligations. This is not to suggest that
2interconnectedness does not matter in other settings. Indeed, there is a literature studying
what happens in interconnected systems when some ¯rms have total current liabilities that
exceed their current assets. This literature includes the studies by Allen and Gale (2000),
Freixas et al. (2000), Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Cifuentes et al (2005) and Nier et al (2007).2
This literature suggests that interconnectedness has two mutually opposing e®ects on the
extent to which the ¯nancial system is able to withstand the failure of one institution. Inter-
connections appear to have the potential both of spreading the failure of a single institution
but also of cushioning its impact (by ensuring that a single institution has only a modest
e®ect on any given other institution).
In common with Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Cifuentes et al (2005) and Nier et al (2007),
the current paper uses graph-theoretic techniques. One di®erence, though, is that I use
numerical techniques sparingly, with most of the results being established analytically. The
cost of this, of course, is that I am able to do this only for relatively simple environments.
My focus on solvent institutions that are subject to trading frictions leads the model to be
closely related to the literature that analyzes interbank payment systems. In such systems,
banks send messages telling one another that they wish to make a payment. In \real time
gross settlements" (RTGS) systems, this message is supposed to lead to an immediate debit
to the paying bank (and a credit to the receiving bank). If the paying bank lacks funds and
does not receive a loan, these debits and credits are not possible in a pure RTGS system,
and one solution is to put them on hold. This was the solution adopted by the Swiss SIC
2Current obligations can exceed expected receipts from assets either because the ¯rm is insolvent long
term or because, as in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, contracts are written in such a way that ¯rms
can only meet their short term commitments if a subset of the agents who are entitled to withdraw funds do
so. This latter situation is often described as one of illiquidity, and it is useful to note the similarities and
di®erences between this notion of illiquidity and the problems of liquidity faced by the ¯rms in my model.
What is similar is that, in both cases, ¯rms have di±culty converting their existing claims into assets that
can be used to pay their current obligations. The di®erence is that, in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
setup, there is no role for liquid assets during a crisis, and the crisis persists even if there is a competitive
centralized market for assets at this time. By contrast, my focus is on a situation where the distinction
between liquid and illiquid assets is crucial during the crisis itself, and liquid assets play a role precisely
because there is no centralized mechanism for settling obligations. It is also worth noting that Freixas et
al. (2000) use the term \gridlock" to describe an equilibrium where depositors at numerous banks decide to
withdraw their deposits prematurely in a variant of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. This term is
used for a di®erent purpose below.
3system in the period 1987{1999, when it o®ered no loans to banks (see Martin 2005).
This solution seems ine±cient when, using the terminology of Bech and SoramÄ aki (2001),
there is \gridlock" in that bank A lacks X dollars that it wishes to pay to bank B, who lacks
X dollars that it wishes to pay to bank C, who in turn lacks X dollars that it wishes
to pay to bank A. In such cases, it is more e±cient to \net" the positions of these three
banks. Some settlements systems, such as CHIPS, are designed to look for sets of payment
messages that can be netted. These systems clear these sets of payments as soon as they
are found. A common alternative, used both by the Fedwire (the U.S. Federal Reserve's
settlements system) and the Swiss system after 1999, is to simply o®er loans (\daylight
overdrafts") to banks that lack su±cient funds to complete their desired payments.3 The
study of settlements systems thus shows that \netting" and the provision of liquidity can be
substitutes for dealing with gridlock.
The current study is related to this literature because it considers situations where, since
all ¯rms have claims that are at least as large in value as their obligations, the ¯nancial
system would operate smoothly if there were extensive netting. My analysis, however, is
more applicable to ¯rms like investment banks and other \nonbank" actors in the ¯nancial
system, who are not members of either a settlements systems with netting like CHIPS or a
settlements system with access to daylight credit from a central bank. They thus rely on
their own liquidity to settle their obligations. A key issue I study, then, is how extensive this
liquidity has to be to avoid gridlock.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 is designed so that it can be skipped. Its purpose
is to contrast the more standard view where intermediaries are modeled as channeling funds
from ultimate borrowers to ultimate lenders (see Diamond (1984) for a classic example) with
a setting where there are debt \cycles" among intermediaries. A simple cycle would be a
situation where a bank B lends to hedge fund A, which acquires claims on a ¯nancial ¯rm
3In the case of Fedwire, Mengle (1985) notes that these daylight overdrafts came into existence because
Fedwire regulations only required paying banks to have su±cient funds \at the end of the day." In the case
of the Swiss system, the performance of the system without central bank liquidity provision was evidently
unsatisfactory.
4C, which in turn uses its funds to lend to B. Such cycles emerge easily when ¯nancial ¯rms,
such as hedge funds, borrow from one ¯rm while holding derivatives that impose ¯nancial
obligations on another. To complete the cycle, the bank ¯nancing the hedge fund must also
have a contract that obligates it to make payments to the hedge fund's counterparty. Section
2 then presents a more complex model of interconnected lending and shows that the degree
of interconnectedness increases the number of ¯rms that must be provided with liquidity if
all debts are to be settled.
Section 3 endogenizes the debt structure of Section 2. The purpose of this is to demon-
strate a pecuniary externality that arises at the stage at which ¯rms decide to whom they
wish to extend loans. When a ¯nancial ¯rm decides not to lend to another, this can easily
reduce the interconnectedness of the ¯nancial system (since the second ¯rm may well be
forced to curtail its lending as well). This means that a ¯rm's decision not to lend can
increase the ease with which other ¯rms settle their obligations in times where liquidity is
short. Thus, the equilibrium degree of interconnectedness can be excessive from a social
point of view.
Section 4 considers a setting where there is an exogenous limit on the number of times that
a unit of liquidity can be used to settle obligations within a period. This may constitute a step
towards realism relative to the case of potentially in¯nite chains of payments considered in
section 2. This limitation on payments implies, in particular, that a larger volume of liquidity
is needed to settle a larger volume of debt, even if interconnectedness is held constant. The
earlier result that interconnectedness makes it more likely that a ¯nancial system with limited
liquidity ¯nds itself unable to settle all obligations is shown to carry over to this case as well.
Section 5 o®ers some concluding remarks.
1 Setting the stage: Vertical lending versus debt cycles
A simple, and standard, view of ¯nancial intermediaries is that these channel funds from
ultimate lenders to ultimate borrowers. As ultimate borrowers repay their obligations, in-
termediaries are able to repay their obligations to ultimate lenders as well. If contracts are
5simple and intermediaries have claims on borrowers that equal their liabilities to lenders, the
capacity of all ultimate borrowers to repay all their debts assures that all intermediaries are
able to settle their own obligations as well. To see this, start with a simple example where
a lender has a claim of z against an intermediary, who in turn has a claim of z against a
borrower. When the borrower repays the z that he owes, the intermediary is able to ful¯ll
his obligation as well.
This result readily extends to other situations where claims are \vertical," so that any
¯rm A that must repay funds to a ¯rm B is acting as a channel from ultimate borrowers to
¯rm B itself. To show this, I brie°y consider a setting where there are two layers of potential
intermediaries, with layer 2 being restricted to receive funds from ultimate borrowers. Layer
1 is restricted to receiving funds directly from ultimate borrowers or indirectly through a ¯rm
from layer 2. Let there be I ultimate lenders indexed by i and J ultimate borrowers indexed
by j. There are also two types of intermediaries. The N type 2 intermediaries indexed by
n can only have claims on ultimate borrowers, and the claim of ¯rm n on ¯nal borrower j
equals c2B
nj . By contrast, the M type 1 intermediaries indexed by m can have claims on both
ultimate borrowers and on type 2 ¯rms, with the size of ¯rm m's direct claims on borrower j
and on ¯rm n being denoted by c1B
mj and c12
mn respectively. Lastly the size of the direct claims
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Firms of type 2 are assumed to pay their debts whenever they can. Equation (2) then im-
plies that, if the ¯nal borrowers pay their obligations, ¯rms of type 2 pay all their obligations
to both the ultimate borrowers and to ¯rms of type 1. Equation (1) then implies that ¯rms
of type 1 are able to pay all their creditors as well. Thus, in this vertical case, nondefault
6by ultimate borrowers implies trivially that all debts are settled. As long as the vertical
structure is maintained, this result does not depend on the number and type of creditors (or
debtors) acquired by the agents.
As we shall see, these variables do matter when there are \horizontal" ties across ¯nancial
intermediaries. Before demonstrating this, it is worth showing that such horizontal ties can
create cycles. If ¯rms 1 owes z to ¯rm 2, who owes z to ¯rm 3, who owes z to ¯rm 1, all
three ¯rms are \solvent" but none is an ultimate borrower. Without any outside source of
liquidity, these ¯rms are unable to settle their debts. In this particular case, the needed
liquidity can be obtained by inserting one of them into a vertical lending relationship. This
is depicted in panel (a) of Figure 1, which can be seen as combining the cycle I just described
with a debt of z from B to 1 and a corresponding debt of z from 1 to L. Now, when B repays
his debt, ¯rm 1 can ¯rst repay ¯rm 2, which repays ¯rm 3, which then makes z available to
¯rm 1 so that it can repay L. Thus, all debts can be settled by the simple device of giving
¯rm 1 access to liquidity from outside the system consisting of f1;2;3g.
While this device can be e®ective, it is not infallible. Its success requires, in particular,
that ¯rm 1 repay ¯rm 2 before it repays L. In this simple case, it may seem obvious that this
is in ¯rm 1's interest. However, consider the simple variant depicted in panel (b) of Figure 1.
Here, ¯rm 1 does not owe funds to an identi¯able ultimate lender L but to ¯rm 4 who in turn
owes funds to L. If ¯rm 1 does not know the creditors of ¯rm 2 and 4, he may sometimes
pay ¯rm 4 before he pays ¯rm 2. It might then be necessary to give ¯rm 1 additional sources
of liquidity to guarantee that all debts are settled. This example demonstrates that, when
there exist horizontal debt ties, full repayment by ultimate borrowers is no longer su±cient
to ensure the settlement of all debts.
One potential way to proceed at this point might be to consider more general debt
patterns that include both vertical relationships and cycles. Because the analysis becomes
intractable quickly, I follow a simpler route. I consider more complicated debts among the
¯rms that lend to one another (the insiders of the ¯nancial system) and then ask about the
properties that liquidity provision from outside this set must satisfy for all debts to be settled.
7One conclusion from this analysis is that, as ¯nancial ¯rms become more interconnected,
ensuring that one ¯rm has access to outside liquidity may no longer be su±cient for settling
all debts.
2 A settlement model with long payments chains
Consider an economy populated by N ¯nancial institutions (or ¯rms) indexed by i 2
[0;1;:::;N ¡ 1] and let these ¯rms be arrayed in a circle so that ¯rm N ¡ 1 is followed
by ¯rm 0. At the start of the settlement period these ¯rms have debts that they are ex-
pected to repay. Each ¯rm starts out by being expected to pay z dollars to the ¯rms whose
index is i + j with j · K where the addition is taken modulo N. Notice that, since each
¯rm owes zK and is owed zK, this combination of debt and assets leaves each ¯rm solvent.
Some ¯rms, in fact, also receive an endowment of a \liquid" asset. What makes this asset
liquid is that it is acceptable by ¯rms that expect to receive a payment of z. One obvious
question is what set of assets passes this test. The main reason an asset is acceptable as
payment to ¯rm j is that ¯rm j expects it to be acceptable to its own creditors. Thus, as
emphasized by Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and Wright (1997), extrinsic beliefs on whether
an asset is acceptable can in°uence whether an asset is in fact acceptable in equilibrium.
A \liquidity crisis" may thus be thought of as a situation where only a small set of assets
remains acceptable for payment. Firms may, for example, become barred from using their
own IOU's as methods of repaying others (or, what may be equivalent, from using their own
IOU's to quickly raise funds with which to pay others).
Even in a liquidity crisis, some assets are likely to remain acceptable for payment, if
for no other reason than the existence of legal tender laws that force lenders to accept
currency for this purpose.4 It thus seems useful to analyze how the ¯nancial sector settles
its inter-¯rm obligations when it has a ¯nite but reduced supply of such liquid assets. If
all these obligations need to be settled simultaneously with liquid assets, the problem is not
4In practice, many government-issued securities appear to maintain this role even when other assets
become unacceptable.
8be very interesting. For full settlement to occur in this case, each ¯rm needs an to have an
endowment of liquid assets that equals its total debt zK. It is more realistic, however, to
suppose that that some liquid assets can be used more than once in the same period because
¯rms can use the liquidity they receive as payment to pay some of their debts in turn.
One way of capturing this idea is to imagine that debts must be settled by the end of a
period of discrete length and that multiple rounds of payments can take place within this
period. This ¯ts to some extent with the practice of dating obligations by calendar date with-
out also specifying the precise time-of-day in which they are due. To allow this mechanism
to be as useful as possible, I suppose that any ¯rm that ¯nds itself simultaneously with some
liquid assets and some obligations transfers liquidity to creditors so as to reduce its debts as
much as possible. Aside from the transfer of liquidity, no other form of communication is
allowed. In practice, the process of consummating, verifying and recording payments does
take some time, so there may be a ¯nite upper bound R to the number of payments that
can be made within the period using a single unit of liquidity. Below, I consider the case
where the upper bound R is binding. I start with an even simpler case where each payment
is processed so rapidly R is e®ectively in¯nite.
To model the consequences of the ¯niteness of the supply of liquidity, I sequentially endow
the ¯nancial ¯rms with units of liquidity and study the resulting outcomes. One can think of
this endowment as arising, as in section 1, from transactions with agents outside the system.
Transactions with outsiders might also drain liquidity from the ¯nancial system. However,
as a ¯rst pass, this is ignored and left for further research. This considerably simpli¯es the
analysis, as does the assumption that ¯nancial ¯rms receive their endowments of liquidity
sequentially.
After one ¯rm receives some liquidity, it uses it to make payments, and the recipients
of these payments make payments in turn. No further liquidity is injected into the system
until the existing units of liquidity can no longer be used to settle existing obligations.
When no further units of liquidity are introduced, and when all the existing liquidity can
no longer be used to satisfy obligations, the settlement period ends. A ¯rm i that still has
9open obligations at this point must pay a cost c. This section focuses on the number of
(sequential) distributions of liquidity from outside the ¯nancial system are needed to settle
all the debts.
Under certain additional conditions, a somewhat surprising result emerges from this
setup. This is that the minimum amount of liquidity that is needed to settle all debts
is arbitrarily small and that it is enough that one ¯rm be endowed with this minuscule
amount of liquidity. To demonstrate this result, it is helpful to notice that one can represent
the claims that ¯rms have against one another with a directed graph G where the vertices
represent ¯rms and where there is an \edge" going from vertex i to vertex j whenever i owes
z to j. The graph G thus has N vertices and NK edges. Because each of these N vertices
has K edges emanating from it and K edges pointing towards it, I use the symbol CK
N to
denote it.
In graph theory, the in-degree of a vertex is the number of edges that end at this vertex
while the out-degree of a vertex is the number of edges that originate at the the vertex.
Further, a directed graph is connected if one can travel from any vertex to another by going
along a series of edges, where travel always goes from the origin to the destination of the
edge. When traveling in this way, a cycle denotes a set of edges that constitute a path from
one vertex back to the same vertex. An Eulerian cycle is a cycle that traverses every edge
of the graph once, and does so in the direction of the edge.
A graph is Eulerian if it has an Eulerian path. One elementary result in graph theory is
that a graph is Eulerian if it is connected and each vertex has an in-degree that equals its
out-degree. A second result that is relevant for this paper is that an Eulerian graph can be
decomposed into cycles which are edge-disjoint so that these cycles do not have any edges
in common while the union of all these cycles contains all the edges of the graph. In the
current model, both the in-degree and the out-degree of each vertex equal K. Moreover, the
graph is connected since one can always reach vertex j from vertex i by traveling to i + 1,
i + 2 and so on until one reaches j (by passing vertex 0 if j < i). Since the in-degree equals
the out-degree of each vertex and the graph is connected, it is Eulerian.
10Proposition 1. Let ¯rm i be endowed with an arbitrarily small amount of liquidity w. Using
just this liquidity, a path of payments can be found such that all debts in CK
N are settled within
the period.
Proof. Let ^ Ci = fi;j;k;:::;ig be an Eulerian cycle originating at i. Suppose ¯rst that
w < z. Then let i give w to j to settle part of his debt with him, let j use these funds to
pay part of his debt to k, and so on along the Eulerian path until these funds reach i. At
this point, everyone's outstanding debt towards its K creditors is z ¡ w. If this exceeds w,
i once again pays w to j and so on along the Eulerian path. When enough Eulerian cycles
of payments have been completed that everyone's outstanding debt ~ z is less than w, i pays
~ z to j who passes it on to k, and so on, until all debts are settled. This last case covers the
case where w ¸ z as well.
While the particular graph considered in this proposition is special, it is clear from the
proof that the condition that is required is that the graph of debt obligations be Eulerian.
As long as all ¯nancial ¯rms are connected to one another, this will be true if each ¯rm's
total obligations to other ¯nancial ¯rms are equal to its total claims from such ¯rms. Since
the model neglects the connections of ¯nancial ¯rms with ultimate borrowers and ultimate
lenders, this is an automatic consequence of supposing that ¯nancial ¯rms are solvent. Sol-
vency would remain su±cient to guarantee this condition if, as in panel (a) of Figure 1,
¯nancial ¯rms that owe funds to ultimate lenders have equal claims on ultimate borrowers.
In practice, these claims are probably unequal for many ¯rms, so solvency does not imply
an Eulerian graph of debts among ¯nancial ¯rms.5 Nonetheless, the basic implication of this
proposition, that a small amount of liquidity provided from outside the ¯nancial system (by
ultimate borrowers, for example) is su±cient for the ¯nancial system to settle all its debts,
may well carry over to this case.
This proposition can be taken to mean that this sector of the economy this economy
needs very little liquidity to settle its debts. Unfortunately, however, this result relies on
5If vertices corresponding to ultimate lenders and ultimate borrowers are included in the graph, the graph
is obviously not Eulerian, since the in-degree and out-degree are not equal for these vertices.
11payments taking a very particular path. It requires, in particular, that these payments move
along an Eulerian cycle. With full information regarding everyone's debts, such cycles can
be computed so that a central planner could force payments to proceed along such a path.
An individual ¯rm, however, has no reason to know the Eulerian path (in part because, in
practice, no ¯rm is likely to know the full range of debts of any ¯rm other than itself). In
addition, the model forbids the communications that would allow a ¯rm to provide incentives
to another to make payments along an Eulerian path.
In this paper, I study mostly paths that, at least in a certain sense, require as much
liquidity as possible. The purpose of this analysis is to understand how much liquidity
might be required to settle all debt under relatively adverse circumstances. To de¯ne these
circumstances, some additional analysis is required.
Suppose that liquidity endowments are of size z (this assumption is relaxed later). As
endowments are used to make payments of z, obligations get extinguished. One can thus
think of the graph that describes these obligations as changing over time, with the edge from
i to j being deleted whenever i pays z to j to settle a debt. When a ¯rm neither has claims
on others nor owes any ¯rm any payments, its vertex can be removed as well. Consider the
initial graph CK
N and give an endowment of z to i. An important property of the model is
that these funds continue to remove edges from the graph until i has no further obligations.
At that point, i's vertex can be removed as well and i's liquidity endowment is back in his
hands. The return of liquidity to the ¯rm that originally obtained it follows from the fact
that each ¯rm has the same number of debts as it has claims on other ¯rms. This implies
that, whenever a ¯rm j with no endowment receives z as payment, j still has a debt that it
can extinguish by paying z to yet another ¯rm. As a result, any unit of liquidity with which
i is endowed continues to be used for payments until it is back in the hands of i himself. As
long as ¯rm i still has obligations, it makes further payments and this implies that payments
continue until i has settled all its obligations and is in possession of its initial endowment.
Let Gt denote the graph that is left after t ¯rms have each been given an endowment of z
and made all the payments that this endowment facilitates, with G0 = CK
N. Let di
t represent
12the total obligations of ¯rm i at t, with di
0 = zK. Suppose that, at stage t, there still exists
a ¯rm i such that di
t > 0. I consider the following twin assumptions regarding the sequential
distribution of endowments and the paths of payments.
Assumption A. If ¯rm j receives an endowment when the graph of obligations is Gt,
the path followed by its ¯rst payment follows one of the shortest cycles in Gt that includes
j. If at any vertex i of this cycle (including the origin j) there is more than one shortest
path back to j, the one that is chosen is the one that maximizes z where the edge fi;i + zg
is included in the cycle. If j still has outstanding debts after earlier payments return to him,
he makes new payments. These are chosen in a like manner. They thus follow the shortest
cycle such that, whenever there is a choice at a vertex i of paths of equal length, it uses the
edge that advances the most from that vertex.
Assumption A is, in a sense at the opposite extreme from Eulerian paths. While those
paths extinguish as many obligations as possible, Assumption A supposes that i's payments
settle as few obligations as possible before returning to i. Assumption A can thus be seen as
an attempt at considering a \bad outcome" where a relatively large amount of liquidity is
needed to settle obligations. This conservatism is counteracted to some extent by Assumption
B:
Assumption B. If a ¯rm j receives an endowment after t ¯rms have received theirs (and
made all possible payments), d
j
t ¸ dk
¿ for all k between 0 and N ¡ 1.
The purpose of Assumption B is to ensure that liquid endowments go to the ¯rms that
need them the most (because they have the largest debts). The reason to make this as-
sumption is that, without it, it is easy to waste massive amounts of liquidity by giving it to
¯rms that have already settled all their obligations in the past. It does not seem reasonable
to compute the minimum amount of liquidity needed by the system while allowing large
amounts of liquidity to be wasted in this manner.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions A and B, the minimum number of ¯rms that must be
provided with liquidity to settle all obligations in G0 = CK
Nis K.
Proof. Start by giving z to ¯rm i. The K shortest cycles starting at i on CK
N start at i + j,
131 · j · K, then go to i + j + K, i + j + 2K and so on, until they reach fi ¡ K;:::;i ¡ 1g,
at which point they return to i (where all these numbers are modulo N). These K cycles
are edge-disjoint and the full set of them touches each vertex once. Once the edges that are
part of these cycles are removed, one can remove vertex i as well since i is left with no debts
or claims. This leaves the graph G1 which is given by C
K¡1
N¡1. In this graph, each vertex has
d
j
1 = K ¡ 1.
Assumption B implies that one of these remaining ¯rms receives the next unit of en-
dowment. By the argument above, Gt is thus C
K¡t
N¡t for all t · K ¡ 1. After K ¡ 1 ¯rms
have been given an endowment, the graph is C1
N¡K+1. Denoting the K'th ¯rm that receives
an endowment by i, this ¯rm pays i + 1, who pays i + 2 and so on until all the debts are
cleared.
This proposition shows both that giving K separate ¯rms an endowment is enough to
clear all debts and that, under assumptions A and B, giving endowments to fewer ¯rms
leaves some ¯rms unable to settle their obligations. Indeed, if only K ¡ 1 ¯rms are given
an endowment, only K ¡ 1 ¯rms clear their debts and the remaining N + 1 ¡ K ¯rms are
unable to do so. This shows that an increase in the interconnectedness of ¯rms increases the
liquidity that is needed to settle all debts under assumptions A and B.
To simplify the presentation, the size of individual endowments and the size of bilateral
obligations have both been set equal to z. This is not essential, however. Let the size of
individual endowments be ze, which is not necessarily equal to z, instead. Then:
Proposition 3. The number of debts that are cleared under assumptions A and B by giving
k ¯rms an endowment of ze is independent of the size of the bilateral obligations z.
Proof. Consider any cycle of payments that takes place when ze = z. If ze > z, this cycle
of payments is still feasible so that the same sequence of payments clears the same debts as
are cleared when the endowment is z. If ze < z, let q equal z=ze when this ratio is rounded
down and let zr = z¡qze. Then replace each cycle of the cycle of payments that takes place
when ze = z by q + 1 cycles, where the ¯rst q transfer ze each and the last transfers zr.
14This proposition also implies that z, and thus the total size of debts, does not a®ect the
minimum amount of liquidity needed. Only the interconnectedness of debts K matters when
R is su±ciently large.
To gain intuition for the model and its behavior consider the simple case shown on Figure
2 where N = 6 and K = 1. Suppose that only ¯rm 0 starts out with liquidity equal to z,
perhaps because it is the only one involved in a vertical lending chain like the one depicted in
panel (a) of Figure 1. Within the ¯nancial system, this ¯rm has no one to pass this liquidity
to other than ¯rm 1, who passes it on to ¯rm 2 and so on until ¯rm 5 returns it to 0. In the
process, all debts are settled. Figure 2 also makes it clear that this result does not depend
on N being equal to 6: no ¯rm has a choice as to whom to pay when K = 1, so all payments
complete a full circle before returning to ¯rm 0.
This can be contrasted with Figure 3 where N = 6 and K = 2 and the left panel shows
C2
6. The middle panel shows an Eulerian cycle. In this cycle, 0 makes a second payment
after the funds it has advanced ¯rst get returned to him. Suppose that the ¯rst payment is
given by the dashed arrows so that the vertices it reaches, in order, are f0;2;4;5;1;3;5;0g.
The second payment then follows the solid arrows so that its path is f0;1;2;3;4;0g. When
all these payments have been made, all obligations have been settled. Note that it is crucial
for this particular Eulerian path to be completed that 5 ¯rst pass to 1 and only later pass
to 0. The right panel shows a less happy outcome where the ¯rst of 0's payments follows
f0;2;4;0g so that 4 passes immediately to 0, while the second payment follows f0;1;3;5;0g,
so that 5 passes to 0 at his ¯rst available opportunity. The multiplicity of choices faced by
each ¯rm in the case K = 2 makes it easier to construct paths of payments such that giving
liquidity to just one ¯rm is insu±cient to settle all debts. As K is increased further, this
multiplicity can be exploited so that even more ¯rms must be given liquidity.
So far, this section has only considered the fully symmetric graph of obligations CK
N. To
study whether ¯rms make optimal decisions when they acquire claims and debts, however,
one must study what happens when one ¯rm has fewer assets and liabilities. It is, of course,
impossible to reduce only one ¯rm's obligations since eliminating i's obligation to j means
15that j is unable to pay o® as many obligations as before. If j responds by reducing its
obligations to k, ¯rm k must further reduce its own debts. This logic implies that, starting
with the graph CK
N, at least one cycle must be removed for i to have one fewer obligation
while ensuring that all ¯rms still have the same number of claims as they do debts. Consider
then, the graph Gi = CK
N ¡ Ci where Ci is a cycle that passes through i.
Intuition would suggest that, since there are fewer debts to settle, complete settlement of
all debts can be accomplished by providing fewer ¯rms with liquidity when debts are given
by Gi than when they are given by CK
N. This can be seen graphically for a special with N = 6
and K = 2 in Figure 4. In this Figure, one cycle has been removed from C2
6, namely the
cycle given by f1;3;5;1g. Inspection of the Figure shows that giving a liquid endowment to
any of the ¯rms with two debts (0, 2 or 4) is enough to clear all debts because these ¯rms
¯rst make a payment that travels along the dashed arrows and then make a second payment
that travels along the solid ones.
Using numerical methods, it is readily shown that the basic conclusion from this example
extends to other values of K and N. I have, in particular, considered a range of values
for these parameters and constructed Gi by subtracting a shortest cycle from CK
N. In other
words, I subtracted a cycle such that all but one of its edges went from a vertex with index i
to a vertex with index i+K, while the remaining edge went from a vertex with index i to a
vertex with index i + r where r is the remainder in the division of N by K. I then assigned
endowments using Assumption B and chose paths of payments consistent with Assumption
A. When a ¯rm receives an endowment, Assumption A uniquely determines these paths. By
contrast, Assumption B does not uniquely determine which ¯rm receives an endowment from
among all the ¯rms that have the maximum total debt. In the case of CK
N, this ambiguity
was not important because all ¯rms were symmetrically placed after an endowment had
been used as much as possible for payments. In the case where one cycle is removed from
CK
N, however, ¯rms are not as symmetric. The numerical analysis reveals that, as a result,
the total number of ¯rms that must be given liquidity to settle all the debts depend on the
identity of the particular ¯rms that are given liquidity. While I did not study this dependence
16exhaustively, many possible allocations were considered and, in all cases, fewer than K ¯rms
had to be given liquidity to settle all debts.
3 A model of multilateral claims acquisition
To show the e®ect of interconnectedness on the amount of liquidity that might be needed
for settlement, one can treat the level of obligations as exogenous, and this is the course
pursued in the Section 2. This analysis leaves open, however, whether the interconnections
that are observed in equilibrium are excessive or not. To show that the equilibrium degree of
interconnectedness need not be socially optimal, this section develops a very simple model of
claims acquisition. This model is somewhat unusual both in the way that it creates demands
for securities and in the centralized mechanism that it postulates for determining who holds
claims on whom. It tries to capture two fairly conventional forces, however. The ¯rst is that
¯rms di®er in the claims that they wish to hold. The second is that ¯nancial intermediaries
have an incentive to maximize the volume of intermediation.
One reason why people and ¯rms may wish to hold di®erent portfolios from one another
is that they di®er in the returns that they expect from di®erent securities. Models where
people di®er in their equilibrium beliefs are somewhat complex, however, and I thus opt for a
simpler approach that relies on \tastes." In particular, ¯rm i is assumed to derive utility u(j)
from holding a claim of z on ¯rm i ¡ j. Claims smaller than z yield no utility, and neither
does utility rise if the size of claims is increased above z. This extreme concavity leads ¯rms
to be unwilling to lend more than z to anyone and this ¯ts with the common tendency of
many ¯nancial market participants to limit their exposures to individual counterparties as
a method to manage their counterparty risk (see Corrigan, Theike et al. 1999, p. B1 for
a description and discussion). I let u(j) be decreasing in the index j so that ¯rms have
an intrinsic preference for holding the claims of ¯rms that are close to them when going
in the direction where the ¯rm index falls. There is an extensive literature demonstrating
that people and ¯rms' portfolios contain relatively large proportions of claims on \local"
creditors, and the model is partially faithful to this e®ect by giving ¯rms a preference for
17claims whose indexes are close to their own.
Explicit modeling of a decentralized system where individuals have something to gain by
arranging trades by third parties is also beyond the scope of this paper, even though the issue
occupies a central role in the ¯nancial services industry. I postulate instead a centralized
mechanism whose aim is to maximize ¯nancial transactions on the basis of messages sent
by participating ¯rms. The message sent by ¯rm i consists of the integer `i. This integer is
interpreted as the number of ¯rms that i is willing to lend to if it has the resources to do so.
Because i is known to have a preference to lend to local ¯rms, the message is taken to mean
that i is willing to lend resources to all ¯rms whose index is i ¡ j where 1 · j · `i and the
subtraction i ¡ j is modulo N.
On the basis of these messages, the mechanism determines the matrix X whose element
Xji is equal to 1 if ¯rm i lends z to j and equals zero otherwise. The ith column thus
indicates the ¯rms to whom i lends funds, while the jth row indicates all the ¯rms that lend
resources to j. Letting ¶ represent a vector of N ones, the requirement that each ¯rm's total
loans be equal to its total obligations can be written as
X¶ = X
0¶ (3)
where X0 is the transpose of X, so the sum of the elements of a row is equal to the sum of
the elements of the corresponding column. The centralized mechanism maximizes the total
value of claims ¶0X¶ subject to two constraints. The ¯rst is (3) and the second is that Xji
can only equal zero or one, and can take the latter value only if i ¡ j 2 f1;:::;`ig. Letting
` denote the full set of messages, the solution to this optimization problem is the matrix
X¤(`). The matrix X¤ is the adjoining matrix of a directed graph, since it has zeros on the
diagonal while some of its o®-diagonal elements equal one. Since X¤
ij is equal to one when i
owes funds to j, and since this debt contract requires i to pass z units of liquidity to j, X¤
is in fact the adjoining matrix for the settlements graph described in the previous sections.
From the perspective of ¯rms i, it is useful to decompose ` into the message sent by i
himself, `i and the messages sent by all other ¯rms `i. Firm i then chooses `i to maximize




u(j ¡ i)Xij ¡ Pi(X
¤)c
where Pi(X¤) is the probability that ¯rm i will be unable to settle one of its obligations given
the debts represented by the matrix X¤. An equilibrium, then, is a set of messages `i that
maximize Ui while taking `i as given. I focus on symmetric equilibria where all ¯rms send
a message `i = ¹ `. Given such symmetric messages, the centralized mechanism sets K = ¹ `
and thereby reproduces the debts considered in the previous section. Assuming that ¹ ` ¯rms
chosen sequentially according to Assumption B are given endowments of liquidity and that
settlements proceed according to Assumption A, Pi = 0. These probabilities are higher if
Assumptions A and B govern who gets liquidity and how it is used but the number of ¯rms
that receive liquidity has a positive probability of being smaller than ¹ `.
For a symmetric equilibrium to exist, no ¯rm must want to unilaterally deviate from
sending a message of ¹ `. When a single ¯rm deviates by setting `i above ¹ `, X¤ is una®ected.
Since the mechanism limits the loans of all other ¯rms to ¹ `, ¯rm i does not have the resources
to increase the number of its loans beyond this. The ine®ectiveness of a message that is above
that of all other ¯rms implies that ¯rms cannot gain or lose from sending messages that are
above the consensus message ¹ `. This indi®erence could justify assuming that ¯rms send
messages of ¹ ` whenever they believe that other ¯rms do so, even if all ¯rms preferred to
make loans to more ¯rms. This could then rationalize equilibria with arbitrarily small (and
even zero) loans. Such equilibria are not robust, since they hinge on reacting to indi®erence
in a very particular way. They are also unattractive because ¯rms appear impotent to change
their loan volume, which does not seem consistent with the active interest that ¯rms seem
to take in their loan exposures.
I thus center my attention on symmetric equilibria where ¯rms are indi®erent with respect
to reductions in `i. A reduction in `i below ¹ `, on the other hand, does a®ect equilibrium
lending because it prevents the centralized mechanism from giving ¯rm i claims on ¹ ` ¯rms.
Indeed, (3) requires a reduction also in the number of ¯rms that lend to i and in the loans
19of at least some of the ¯rms to whom i would have lent if `i had been set equal to ¹ `.
Consider then, a deviation where `i = ¹ `¡1. Because i can end up with at most `i claims
and obligations, the resulting X¤ must feature at least one less cycle passing through i than
the graph C
¹ `
N. Since the mechanism seeks to maximize the number of edges remaining in X¤,
it removes a shortest cycle. As discussed in the previous section, this implies that endowing
¹ ` ¡ 1 ¯rms with liquidity is su±cient to settle all debts under assumptions A and B.
The aim of this section is only to demonstrate that the acquisition of claims need not
be optimal. I thus proceed to construct a special case where private and social interests
diverge, with the hope that it provides some intuition that is more generally valid. Suppose
that assumptions A and B hold, that it is certain that at least ¹ K ¡ 1 ¯rms will receive
endowments of liquidity and that there is a probability ¹ that ¹ K ¯rms will do so. I now
consider a su±cient condition for an equilibrium to exist such that all ¯rms set `i equal to
¹ K.
At such an equilibrium, all debts are settled with probability (1¡¹). With the remaining
probability, N ¡ ¹ K +1 ¯rms are left with one unpaid debt, while ¹ K ¡1 ¯rms settle all their
debts because they receive an endowment of liquidity. This means that a ¯rm i that deviates
from the proposed equilibrium by setting `i = (¹ ` ¡ 1) increases its probability of settling
all its debts from (1 ¡ ¹ + ¹( ¹ K ¡ 1)=N) to one. It thus avoids the expected default costs
¹c(N ¡ ¹ K + 1)=N. Since the ¯rm loses u( ¹ K) by doing so, it is indi®erent with respect to
this deviation if
u( ¹ K) =
¹c(N ¡ ¹ K + 1)
N
(4)
Condition (4) ensures that there is an equilibrium with ¹ ` = ¹ K. Symmetric equilibria with
smaller numbers of loans also exist if all ¯rms set `i to smaller values. What is less appealing
about these equilibria is that all ¯rms prefer to have more debts, so their existence relies on
¯rms sending the message ¹ ` rather than ¹ ` + 1 only because they are sure that it will make
no di®erence. To see this, consider an equilibrium with ¹ ` = ¹ K ¡ 1. If ¯rm j thought that it
stood a chance of obtaining ¹ K debts and assets by sending a message of ¹ K, it would do so.
Its bene¯t from doing so would be u( ¹ K). Its loss, meanwhile, would be ¹c(N ¡ ¹ K +1)=N if
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did it for ¯rm j to end up with ¹ K debts and assets, Assumption B ensures that ¯rm j would
have a greater than ( ¹ K ¡1)=N probability of being a recipient of a liquidity endowment. It
would then be assured of settling its debts even if only ¹ K ¡1 receive an endowment. It thus
stands some chance to gain, and no chance to lose by sending a message of ¹ K.
For equilibria with even lower values of ¹ `, a single ¯rm is strictly better o® if sending a
message of ¹ `+1 leads it to acquire ¹ `+1 debts and assets. At these lower levels of indebtedness,
all debts are settled with probability one, so that the ¯rm simply gains u(¹ `+1) if it succeeds
in increasing the size of its balance sheet.
I now study the social consequences of having ¯rm i reduce `i from ¹ K to ¹ K ¡ 1. For a
certain number of ¯rms, this reduces the number of their debtors and creditors by one. Given
that the mechanism maximizes total debts, the number of ¯rms thus a®ected is N=K if N
is divisible by K and is otherwise 1 + N=K. These ¯rms all lose u( ¹ K) ¡ ¹c(N ¡ ¹ K + 1)=N
so that they neither gain or lose anything. For the rest of the ¯rms, there is a net gain
of ¹c(N ¡ ¹ K + 1)=N since their debts are now settled for sure. To obtain the total social
gain, one multiplies this individual gain by (N ¡ N= ¹ K) when N is divisible by ¹ K and by
(N ¡N=K ¡1) otherwise. The reason these social gains exist is that Assumption A implies
that liquidity is not used in its most socially e±cient manner. This means that reducing a
few ¯rms' liquidity requirements allows many other ¯rms to take advantage of the liquidity
that is thus freed up.
4 Short payments chains
There are several reasons to be interested in situations where there are limits to the number
of payments that can be settled by a unit of liquidity. One might suppose, for example, that
the processing of each payment takes a discrete amount of time ¿ while the length of the
trading day is itself limited and equal to T. It is then impossible to use a unit of liquidity for
more than T=¿ payments on a given calendar day and this may a®ect the amount of liquidity
that one needs to settle the debts that come due on that day. As one ¯rm is paying a second
21during a particular time interval, a third ¯rm might be able to learn that it will receive the
resulting funds later on. This third ¯rm may thus be both able and willing to make a nearly
simultaneous payment to a fourth ¯rm using funds raised though a \daylight" loan. This
parallel processing of payments may allow a unit of liquidity to be used more than T=¿ in a
given day.6
Nonetheless, there may well be limitations on the process of making payments in advance
of receiving liquidity. One of these is that, when a bank's daylight loan is repaid, the bank
receives liquidity. This liquidity can only be used to settle more debts if the bank lends it
anew. If the bank fails to do so, only the original cascade of payments using the system's
actual liquidity continues unabated.
This section thus takes up the case where the maximum number of times that a unit of
liquidity can be used, R, is smaller than N ¡K so that the paths of payments considered in
Section 2 are infeasible. One immediate consequence of this is that the total liquidity that
is needed to settle all debts now depends on the volume of debt in addition to depending
on the number of interconnections among ¯rms. To see this, imagine a pattern of liquidity
endowments that settles all debts when each ¯rm owes z to each of its creditors. If each
bilateral debt is of size ¸z (so that the total debt is multiplied by ¸), it can be settled
by the same sequence of endowments, as long as each endowment is multiplied by ¸ as
well. Conversely, if one multiplies every bilateral debt by a su±ciently large ¸, the original
distribution of liquidity endowments will be insu±cient to settle all debts.
When R is small enough that it prevents liquidity from returning to the ¯rm that was
originally endowed with it, Assumption A becomes inappropriate. Because one role of this
assumption was to prevent payments from following Eulerian paths, which were even longer,
it might be desirable to leave payment paths unconstrained when they are already being
limited by the size of R. At least some of the analysis in this section is valid for such
arbitrary paths. Still, some of the proofs of this section rely on tracing out the e®ects of
6If these loans are costly, ¯rms would prefer to pay with cash that they have already received, and this
might dampen the use of this borrowing. See Angelini (1998) for a model where priced intraday credit leads
¯rms to postpone their payments until they have cash on hand.
22particular sequences of liquidity endowments and these e®ects do hinge on the way ¯rms use
the liquidity they receive. For this reason, I consider a simple modi¯cation of Assumption
A, which maintains the idea that payments are made along edges that advance the index as
much as possible. This is:
Assumption A'. If ¯rm j receives an endowment when the graph of obligations is Gt,
and the shortest cycles that include j are longer than R, then each ¯rm i that is able to
make a payment to a creditor based on j's endowment makes this payment to the creditor
whose index is furthest from i.
Assumption B, on the other hand, does not require modi¯cation in the sense that the
total debt of each ¯rm is still well-de¯ned at each stage so that one can give liquidity to one of
the ¯rms with the largest outstanding obligations. Unfortunately, imposing a limitation on
the size of payment paths implies that ¯rms with the same total debt can be quite di®erently
situated in other ways. Some, for example, may have creditors with debts while others may
have creditors that have already repaid theirs. By the same token, the maximum length
of the payment chains originating from one ¯rm may be quite di®erent from that of chains
originating from another.
A consequence of the fact that ¯rms end up being quite asymmetrically placed after some
units of liquidity have been used to make payments is that it seems di±cult to study the
general properties of CK
N. I thus start by analyzing in detail the special case where N = 6 and
K is equal to either 1, so that the required payments are given in Figure 2, or 2, so that the
required payments are depicted in the left panel of Figure 3. After these cases are analyzed
in detail, I show that some of the basic results concerning the e®ect of interconnectedness
generalize. To demonstrate the importance of interdependence, the total debt of ¯rms d is
made independent of K and set equal to 2z.
This raises the immediate question of how large are the endowments that are sequentially
distributed according to Assumption B. One possibility is to distribute this liquidity in small
increments. I show that, when these increments are su±ciently small, interconnectivity
among ¯rms does not a®ect the minimum amount of liquidity that is needed to settle all
23the debts. By contrast, if liquidity is distributed in large doses, this interconnectivity does
matter. The case of large doses may be more realistic because it captures the idea that certain
¯rms have ample access to liquidity (because they receive it from ultimate borrowers, for
example) while other ¯rms do not (because, continuing with the example, they deal only
with other ¯nancial ¯rms). The analysis shows that in this case, interconnectedness does
make it more likely that the economy will su®er costs as a result of insu±cient liquidity.
Interconnectedness also does not matter in the related special case that we have already
seen, namely when R = 1 so that each unit of liquidity can only be used once. As we saw, the
complete settlement of all debts then requires that each ¯rm start out with a liquidity equal
to its total debt. This case is not particularly interesting, however, because the capacity
of ¯rms to make payments with funds that they receive on the same day appears to be
important in practice. The simplest model where this is possible has R = 2, and much of
the analysis in this section is focused on this case.
To demonstrate the importance of the size of the liquidity endowments that ¯rms receive,
I compare the case where each ¯rm that receives exogenous liquidity receives z units to the
case where the size of the sequentially distributed endowments is 2z. In the former case, we
have
Proposition 4. When R = 2, liquidity endowments of size z = d=2 are distributed sequen-
tially according to Assumption B, and debts are given either by C1
6 or by C2
6, the minimum
number of distributions to clear all debts is 6 and the maximum is 8.
Proof. See Appendix.
The logic of this proposition implies that the same total amount of liquidity is needed
if the distributions are equal to d=2n where n is an integer. It su±ces to distribute these
endowments in n rounds, each of which follows the sequence of endowments considered
Proposition 4. This proposition demonstrates that K does not matter very much when
the endowments are distributed gradually while always going to ¯rms that need them most
acutely. The degree of interconnectedness does matter, however, when the endowments of
24individual ¯rms cover all their obligations, so that they equal 2z. To see this, the next two




Proposition 5. Let the initial pattern of debts be given by C1
6 while R = 2 and liquidity
distributions equal d = 2z. Under assumptions A' and B, the smallest number of liquidity
endowments that leads all debts to be settled is 3 while the largest is 5.
Under the further assumption that the endowment of liquidity is received with equal proba-
bility by all ¯rms that satisfy Assumption B, the probability that 3 endowments of liquidity are
su±cient equals 1/4, the probability that exactly 4 are needed equals 17/24 and the probability
that 5 are necessary equals 1/24.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result can be contrasted to the analogous one when K = 2.
Proposition 6. Let the initial pattern of debts be given by C2
6 while R = 2 and liquidity
distributions equal d = 2z. Under assumptions A' and B, the smallest number of liquidity
endowments that leads all debts to be settled is 4 while the largest is 6.
Under the further assumption that the endowment of liquidity is received with equal proba-
bility by all ¯rms that satisfy Assumption B, the probability that 4 endowments of liquidity are
su±cient equals 1/4, the probability that exactly 5 are needed equals 2/3 and the probability
that 6 are necessary equals 1/12.
Proof. See Appendix.
These propositions point to several important contrasts between the case of K = 1 and
the case of K = 2. First, the minimum number of ¯rms that need to receive an endowment
for all debts to settle is smaller when K = 1. Second, the maximum number of ¯rms that
need to be given an endowment is also smaller when K = 1. Lastly, the distribution of
the amount of liquidity that is needed under C2
6 stochastically dominates the corresponding
25distribution under C1
6. The ¯rst two of these results can be generalized somewhat, as the
following propositions show.
Proposition 7. Let each of N ¯rms have a total debt equal to d and be owed d by others.
Suppose that N is divisible by R > 1 and that liquidity endowments are equal to d. Then,
under assumptions A' and B, the minimum number of liquidity endowments needed to clear
all debts when these are given by C1
N equals N=R while this number is strictly larger if they
are given by CK
N with K > 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition suggests that settling all obligations is more complex when K > 1. When
K = 1, it su±ces to space the recipients of exogenous liquidity so that their indices di®er
by R. By contrast, when K > 1 so that each ¯rm makes payments to a variety of ¯rms,
the early endowments lead many ¯rms to have their debts reduced slightly. This means that
later endowments debts cannot be used to settle as many debts so that more ¯rms must be
given endowments if all debts are to be settled.
Proposition 8. For debts that can be described by C1
N, the maximum number of liquidity
endowments of size d needed to clear all debts is N ¡ R + 1. If K > 1 and R = K then, for
N large enough, the maximum number of endowments of size d needed to clear all debts is
N.
Proof. see Appendix.
A building block for this result is that the ¯rst endowment clears R debts when K = 1
whereas only one debt is cleared by this endowment when K > 1. Perhaps more important
than the di®erence in the maximum number of ¯rms that need to be given an endowment
is that this maximum number requires a very particular distribution of endowments when
K = 1. Indeed, there is only a single sequence that accomplishes the upper bound in
Proposition 8 when K = 1. By contrast, while a speci¯c sequence is used to demonstrate
the upper bound for K > 1 in proposition 8, the proof makes it clear that several similar
26sequences would serve the same purpose. Thus, the outcome where every ¯rm needs liquidity
when K > 1 does not appear to have a vanishing probability. The reason is that the payments
made by ¯rms when K > 1 are much more fragmented throughout the economy. It is thus
easier to ¯nd ¯rms with considerable debts that make payments only to ¯rms that either
have lots of debts themselves (so that they do not ¯nish settling their debts) or to ¯rms that
have already ¯nished settling all their own debts.
5 Conclusions
We have seen that limits on the amount of liquid assets that are available to the ¯nancial
system for the payment of debts can lead to more defaults when the web of debts is more
densely interconnected. It might be tempting to read this as implying that governments
should be more prepared to lend resources for the purpose of debt settlement when debts are
interconnected. This conclusion does not entirely follow from the current analysis, however.
To isolate the e®ect of trading frictions that require ¯rms to settle their debts with liquid
assets, the model supposes that all ¯rms have claims that are at least as large as their
obligations. By assumption, then, a program of lending to all ¯rms so that they can cover
their obligations does not make losses. This raises the question, which is not explored in
the current paper, of why private ¯rms do not lend and thereby eliminate the di±culties I
discuss. One possibility is that periods of liquidity problems also involve genuine credit risk.
A proper evaluation of a government lending program would then have to take into account
the potential for ¯nancial losses.
The lack of private lending also has a potential alternative explanation which is closer to
the spirit of this paper. This is that the resources of individual private lenders are limited
so that no single ¯rm has su±cient lendable assets to guarantee that the entire ¯nancial
system settles its debts. As demonstrated in section 3, the existence of an upper bound on
the number of payments that can be made with a unit of liquidity implies that a ¯rm that
makes a payment on its debts cannot be sure to receive a payment back on the claims that
it has on other ¯rms. By the same token, an institution that lends liquidity to a ¯rm so
27that it can pay its obligations cannot be sure that the ¯rm will be able to pay it back with
funds recovered from its debtors. This suggests that limitations on the amount of liquidity
that any one ¯rm can lend might make it possible for all ¯rms to be too afraid to lend.
Given that an increase in debt interconnections raises the amount of liquidity that may be
needed to clear all debts, it may also increase the likelihood that ¯rms become too afraid to
lend to one another. Lending by a government with larger resources than those available to
individual ¯rms might then be justi¯able.
To simplify the analysis, the model assumes a great deal of symmetry, and much of the
analysis involves ¯rms that have to pay the same quantity z to the same number K other
¯rms. This symmetry allows me to be somewhat silent concerning the maturity of the debts
involved. One can interpret z as the coupon on a long term debt (so that each ¯rm's debt
is expected to be unchanged when the period is over) or as principal plus interest on short
term debt (so that ¯rms are massively reducing their exposure to one another). In the latter
case, z is obviously much larger for a given market value of total debt so that more liquidity
is needed if payment chains are limited in length. The model thus suggests conditions under
which more liquidity is needed when the maturity of inter-¯rm debts is shorter.
It is easy to see that the model would be more realistic if it involved less symmetry, as
well as if it incorporated explicitly ¯rms' vertical debt relations with borrowers and lenders
outside the ¯nancial system itself. It is important to stress, however, that considerable
care will have to be employed when generalizing the model in these directions to maintain
analytic tractability. To get an idea of the vast distance that separates what can be proven
analytically for related graphs when the interconnectivity parameter K is varied and the sort
of conjectures that experts regard as plausible, the reader is referred to Alon et al (1996).
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30Appendix: proofs of some propositions
Proof of proposition 4
The size of the system's total debt is 6d = 12z for both C1
6 and C2
6. Since each endowment
of z can only be used twice, the theoretical minimum number of endowments needed to clear
all debts is 6. In the case of C1
6, this minimum can be obtained by ¯rst giving endowments to
¯rms 0, 2 and 4 in sequence (thereby leaving each ¯rm with a debt of z) and then repeating
this sequence.
In the case of C2
6, the minimum can be obtained as follows. First give an endowment to
¯rm 0. Using Assumption A', this removes the edges (0;2) and (2;4). Then give an endow-
ment to ¯rm 1, removing the set of edges f(1;3);(3;5)g. Follow this with an endowments
to 4 and 5 (in either order), thereby removing the edges (4;0);(0;1);(5;1) and (1;2). Then,
end by giving endowments to 2 and 4 (in either order) to clear the edges (2;3);(3;4);(4;5)
and (5;0).
Examples can also be found where sequences of 8 endowments of liquidity are needed to
clear all debts (so that cutting one of these sequences short would lead some ¯rms to be in
default). In the case of C1
6, a sequence with this property involves giving units of liquidity
to 0, 2, 4, 0, 5, 4, 3 and 2. The last four of these endowments are used only once because
they are given to ¯rms whose creditors have already settled all their debts. In the case of
C2
6, a sequence with this property involves giving liquidity to 0, 3, 1, 4, 5, 4, 2 and 1. Once
again, the last four of these endowments are used only once each.
I now show that more than 8 allocations of liquidity are not needed. Given that total
debts equal 12z, only four debts of z each are left if the ¯rst four endowments can settle
two debts of z each. This implies that one does not need more than 8 units of liquidity if
the ¯rst four units clear two debts. By enumerating all possible sequences of the initial four
endowments that satisfy Assumptions A' and B, one can observe that they each allow these
units of liquidity to be used twice.
Consider ¯rst the case of C1
6. If 3 is given a unit of liquidity after 0, Assumptions A' and
B imply that the next units of liquidity must go to 2 and 5 (in either order). All four of these
31units are used twice. If 5 is given a unit of liquidity after 0, ¯rms 2, 3, and 4 are left with 2
debts of z each and this means that one of the next two units of liquidity must be given to
2 while the other goes to either 3 or 4. In either case, they are each used twice. Lastly, if
either 2 or 4 are given a unit of liquidity after 0, the next unit goes to the other member of
this pair. This leaves every ¯rm with a debt of z, so that the next unit of liquidity can go
to any ¯rm, and will be used twice.
Now consider the case of C2
6. If ¯rm 1 is given a z units of liquidity after ¯rm 0, the
next endowments of liquidity must go to ¯rms 4 and 5 (in either order) because they each
have 2z of debts remaining. If ¯rm 3 is given an endowment after 0, the next endowments
go to ¯rms 1 and 4 in either order. If ¯rm 4 is given an endowment after 0, the next ones go
to 1 and 3 in either order. Lastly, if ¯rm 5 receives an endowment after 0, the next two go
to ¯rms 3 and 4 in either order. In each of these cases, the ¯rst four endowments are used
twice.
Proof of proposition 5
Since total obligations equal 12z, each endowment equals 2z and can be used at most to
make 2 payments, a minimum of 3 endowments is needed to settle all debts. This minimum
is achieved by giving endowments to ¯rms 0, 2 and 4 in any order. Each of these ¯rms passes
its endowment to the ¯rm with an index just above their own, and this ¯rm in turn passes
these funds to its own creditor.
The ¯rst endowment, which goes to ¯rm 0 by convention, clears the debts of two ¯rms so
that it leaves obligations of 8z. Given that both debts and endowments equal 2z, any subse-
quent endowment clears at least 2z worth of debts. This implies that, at most, 4 additional
¯rms have to be given endowments of 2z. Four ¯rms are indeed needed if endowments are
received in the sequence f5;4;3;2g, which is consistent with Assumption B.
Suppose now that all ¯rms that satisfy Assumption B are equally likely to get liquidity.
After 0 has used his liquidity and this has gone to ¯rms 1 and 2, the 4 ¯rms in this sequence
are left with a single debt of 2z each and have a probability 1/4 of obtaining liquidity at
this stage. The sequence that leads 5 ¯rms to need liquidity starts by giving an endowment
32to ¯rm 5, then gives an endowment to ¯rm 4 (which has a probability 1/3 of occurring after
5 receives the ¯rst unit) and then gives an endowment to ¯rm 3 (which has a probability
1/2 of occurring after 5 and 4 have received theirs). Thus, the probability of this outcome
is (1/4)(1/3)(1/2)=1/24.
To ensure that it is su±cient to give liquidity to 3 ¯rms, ¯rms 2 and 4 must be given
endowments after 0, with the order that they receive it in being unimportant. If ¯rm 2
receives an endowment after ¯rm 0, this ¯rm pays o® 3, which settles its debt with 4. Thus,
only 4 and 5 are left with debts and there is an equal probability that each will receive the
next unit of endowment. The sequences f2;4g and f4;2g thus each have a probability 1/8
(since 2 and 4 each have an initial probability of 1/4).
Proof of proposition 6
Start again with the arbitrary assumption that 0 is the ¯rst ¯rm to receive an endow-
ment. Letting this ¯rm's payments follow the paths implied by Assumption A', the graph
of remaining obligations is given by panel (a) in Figure 5. This leaves 3, 4, and 5 with two
debts each so that one of these ¯rms receives the next endowment of liquidity. Panels (b),
(c), and (d) of Figure 5 display the debts that remain after giving liquidity to 3, 4 and 5 re-
spectively. It is immediately apparent from inspecting these ¯gures that there is no method
for extinguishing the remaining debts by giving liquidity to just one additional ¯rm.
If all endowment distributions satisfying Assumption B are equally likely, panels (b), (c)
and (d) of Figure 5 each have a probability 1/3 of representing the graph of obligations after
the second round. From panel (d) of Figure 5, it follows that giving liquidity to ¯rm 5 after
¯rm 0 leads 5 units of liquidity to be required to settle all debts regardless of whether ¯rm
3 or 4 is given liquidity after ¯rm 5 (and these are the only possibilities consistent with
Assumption B). The extreme cases where 4 or 6 units of liquidity are required thus involve
giving liquidity to either ¯rm 3 or 4 after giving it to ¯rm 0.
If ¯rm 4 receives liquidity after ¯rm 0, panel (c) describes the outcome and, Assumption
B guarantees that ¯rm 3 is given liquidity next. There is then a probability 1/2 that the
next unit of liquidity goes to ¯rm 1, which leads all debts to be settled with just four units
33of liquidity. The overall probability of this sequence is thus 1/6.
Now consider panel (b) in Figure 5, which is the result of following the endowment to
¯rm 0 with an endowment to ¯rm 3. Starting from this point, there is a probability 1/2
that the next endowment goes to either ¯rm 1 or ¯rm 4. Having gone to one of these ¯rms,
there is a 1/2 probability that the following endowment goes to the other. There is thus a
1/4 conditional probability that all debts are settled with four units of liquidity. The total
probability of needing just 4 units of liquidity to settle all debts is thus 1/6+(1/3)(1/4)=1/4.
Also starting in panel (b), there are several sequences in which all four ¯rms with out-
standing debts must receive endowments for all debts to settle (so that the total number
of ¯rms that must receive an endowment equals 6). These sequences require that ¯rm 1
receive an endowment before an endowment is given to ¯rm 2 while ¯rm 4 receives an en-
dowment before ¯rm 5 receives one. One example of this is the sequence f0;3;2;1;5;4g.
Starting at the stage described in panel (b), the probability that the next endowment will
go to either ¯rms 2 or 5 equals 1/2. Conditional on this occurring, there is a 1/2 probability
that the other of these two ¯rms will receive an endowment before ¯rms 1 or 4 do. Thus,
the overall probability that six ¯rms need to receive an endowment to settle all debts is
(1/3)(1/4)=1/12.
Proof of proposition 7
In the case of C1
N, it su±ces to give endowments to ¯rm with indices given by iR with
i = 0;:::;N=R to clear all debts. For the provision of d units of liquidity to N=R ¯rms to be
su±cient to settle all dN debts, liquidity endowments of d must on average settle dR debts.
Since dR is the maximum amount of debt that an endowment can settle, every liquidity
endowment must settle this amount of debt.
Now consider the case where K > 1 and R > 1. The ¯rst ¯rm that receives a liquidity
endowment has a debt of d outstanding and makes payments of d=K to K ¯rms. According
to Assumption A', each of these K ¯rms make a payment to a ¯rm whose index is K larger
than their own, and the same is true for the recipients of these payments. This implies that
all subsequent payments are received (and made) by distinct ¯rms. As a result, the ¯rst
34liquidity endowment reduces the outstanding debt of Q = 1 + K(R ¡ 1) ¯rms. Thus, N=Q
is the maximum number of ¯rms that can be given liquidity at a point where their total
obligations still equal d. Because R > 1 and K > 1, Q > R, so that providing liquidity to
N=Q ¯rms is not enough to settle all debts. Providing liquidity to more ¯rms implies that
some ¯rms receive liquidity when their obligations are smaller than d, so that less than dR
debts are settled with the liquidity they receive. Thus, giving liquidity to N=R ¯rms is also
insu±cient.
Proof of proposition 8
In the case where K = 1, the ¯rst liquidity endowment clears the debts of R ¯rms and no
endowment given to any ¯rm thereafter clears less than one debt. So, N ¡R+1 endowments
are su±cient. A particular sequence that requires this many endowments consists of ¯rst
giving an endowment to ¯rm 0. This is followed by giving endowments to ¯rms N ¡1, N ¡2
and continuing, backwards one by one, until one reaches ¯rm R.
In the case of K > 1 and R > K, a sequence of endowment distributions has the property
that every single ¯rm must be given an endowment for all debts to be extinguished if each
individual distribution extinguishes only the debts of the recipient of this distribution. I now
describe such a sequence, demonstrating along the way that each distribution extinguishes
only one debt. To describe it, it is useful to let Ij represent the index of the ¯rm which is
given liquidity at the jth step of this sequence. As always let the ¯rst ¯rm that is given
liquidity be ¯rm 0 so I1 = 0. As long as K > 1, this distribution extinguishes only the
debts of ¯rm 0. Under Assumption A', it leads all ¯rms with indices between 1 and K2 to
receive a payment, though only ¯rms with indices between 1 and (K ¡1)K make a payment
themselves (so that they reduce their obligations by d=K).
For j between 2 and K, let Ij = N ¡2K +3¡j (so that the ¯rst of these ¯rms receiving
an endowment has index w0 = N ¡ 2K + 1 and the last one has index w1 = w0 ¡ K + 2).
Notice that the ¯rst of these endowments leads all ¯rms between w0 + 1 and N ¡ 1 to
make one payment, and also leads ¯rms with indices between 1 and [1 + (K ¡ 1)(K ¡ 3)]
to make payments. If K > 2, the second of these endowments also leads several ¯rms with
35indices between 1 and (K ¡ 2)(K ¡ 4) to make payments. This number is smaller than
the corresponding number in the case of the ¯rst of these endowments because I3 < I2 and
because the ¯rms between w0 and (K ¡2)(K ¡4) have made payments already, so that the
edges that capture the payments based on the second of these endowments are shorter.
When they receive payments based on the endowment given to IK, the ¯rms with indices
between w0 and N ¡ 1 have already received and made K ¡ 2 payments, so that they make
payments to ¯rms whose index exceeds their own by 2. This implies that the last ¯rm to
make payments based on this endowment has an index of w0¡K+2+K+2(K¡2) = N ¡1.
This ¯rm makes a payment to the ¯rm with index 1. At this stage, no one owes this ¯rm
anything, but this ¯rm still has an obligation of d=K outstanding (to ¯rm 2). Note also that
the endowment given to IK also leaves the ¯rms with indices between w and N ¡1 with one
obligation each, since they have been able to make K ¡ 1 payments with the endowments
given to the ¯rms between I2 and IK. At this stage, none of the ¯rms whose indices are
between K(K ¡1)+1 and w ¡K ¡3 = N ¡3K +3 has made any payments, and there are
M = N ¡ K2 ¡ 4K + 3 such ¯rms.
For N large enough, one can ¯nd two integers m0 and m1 such that
M = m0K(K ¡ 1) + m1(1 + K(K ¡ 1))
since m1 can be set equal to the remainder in the division of N by K(K ¡ 1). For K <
j · K + m0, set Ij = w1 ¡ (j ¡ K)K(K ¡ 1). For K + m0 < j · K + m0 + m1, set
Ij = w1¡m0K(K¡1)¡(j¡K¡m0)(1+K(K¡1)). To see the e®ects of these endowments,
start with IK+1 = w1 ¡ K(K ¡ 1). The ¯rm with this index makes payments to all K of its
creditors. The payments received by the (K ¡1) ¯rms whose index is closest to IK+1 lead to
K¡1 additional payments because w1¡K(K¡1)+r+(K¡2)K is less than w1 for all r smaller
than or equal to K¡1. The payment that ¯rm w1¡K(K¡1) makes to ¯rm w1¡K(K¡1)+K
only leads to K ¡2 additional payments because, w1¡K(K ¡1)+K +(K ¡2)K is equal to
w¡1, and this ¯rm has already received an endowment. The e®ect of this endowment is thus
to eliminate the debts of IK+1 while leaving all ¯rms with indices between IK+1 and IK with
36one less obligation. By the same logic, the endowments to ¯rms Ij with K+1 < j · K+m0
eliminate the debts of one ¯rm and reduce the debt of K(K ¡1)¡1 ¯rms by one obligation.
This logic also implies that the endowments to ¯rms Ij with K + m0 < j · K + m0 + m1
eliminate the debts of one ¯rms while reducing the debts of K(K ¡1) debts by d=K (as was
the case of the endowment given to ¯rm 0).
After these endowments, ¯rms with indices between 1+(K¡1)(K¡3) and w1 have either
completed all their payments (if they have received an endowment) or made one payment of
d=K so that they have K¡1 obligations outstanding. If an endowment is now given to w1¡1,
this ¯rm's payments to its remaining K¡1 creditors do not lead to any subsequent payments.
The reason is that these go to ¯rms with indices between w1 and w1 + K ¡ 1 = w0 and all
these ¯rms have already received endowments. So, let IK+m0+m1+1 = w1 ¡ 1. Consider next
the ¯rm w1 ¡ 2. Unless it has received an endowment already, it has K ¡ 1 creditors, all of
whom have already received an endowment. Thus giving an endowment to ¯rm w2¡2 leads
only this ¯rm to become free of all obligations. One can now proceed to give endowments one
by one to ¯rms by reducing their indices all the way until one reaches ¯rm 1. By proceeding
in this way, the number of obligations of the ¯rms that receive endowments is falling over
time (consistent with Assumption B), and each endowment clears only the debts of the ¯rm
receiving it. After this is done, one gives endowments to the ¯rms whose indices are between
N ¡ 1 and w0 moving backwards one by one. Each of these ¯rms has one obligation and, if
one proceeds backwards, the recipient of their payment has already received an endowment
so that he is incapable of making further payments.
37Figure 1: An example combining vertical lending with a cycle
Figure 2: An example with K = 1
38Figure 3: An example with K = 2
Figure 4: An example with K = 2 and a missing cycle
39Figure 5: Remaining obligations of C2
6 when R = 2
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